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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 15568 
WILLIE Ml1E WALKER, aka 
DELL WALKER, 
Appellant. 
* * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession 
of narcotics with the intent to distribute and a sentence 
of fifteen years thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of her conviction and 
either the direction of a verdict of acquittal or a new 
trial. 
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STATEHENT OF FACTS 
On the 14th day of July, 1976, police officers 
obtained a search warrant to search for narcotics at the 
premises of 511-513 West Second South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(R. 37). The upstairs portion of that premises was a rooming 
house or apartment complex which contains approximately 
six apartments (See State's Exhibit 1). Several of the rooms 
or apartments were occupied (Tr. 79, 100). All of the apartmn 
were searched by the police and narcotics were found in t\Vo oi 
the rooms and on one person who was on the premises. Three 
arrests were made. 
During the course of the search, 56 balloons of heroic. 
were found in a night stand in Room 6 as appears on Exhibit 1 : 
I 
(Tr. 40-43). The defendant in this case, the appellant herein! 
is charged IVith possession with the intent to distribute 
I 
those 56 balloons of heroin. The evidence \Vas clear that t~ I 
room in IVhich the narcotics were found was not the bedroom 
of the defendant (Tr. 53). The room in which the narcotics 
were found appeared to be a bedroom in which there was also 
a desk containing business records from the restaurant 
below (Tr. 53-54). The defense witnesses testified that the 
room was occupied by a man by the name of Hobert \vestley 
(Tr. 165-166, 115). The police testified that none of 1 
Mr · Westley's clothes were found in the room, that the defenca·l 
indicated that Westley was not staying in the room, and that I 
the defendant had control over the room (Tr. 80, 81, 82). 
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The defense preferred the testimony of Mr. James Housley 
for the purpose of showing that Mr. Westley did, in fact, 
occupy the room wherein the narcotics were found. Mr. Housley 
was a Salt Lake County Attorney at the time of the trial and 
it was hoped that his testimony would be persuasive because 
of the fact that he was a lav~er -- he was white -- and he 
was working for the prosecution. Mr. Housley, while in 
private practice, had consulted with Robert Westley and had 
observed him in that room in nightclothes getting out of bed. 
However, the Court refused to allow his testimony on grounds 
of foundation. 
The jury convicted the defendant and she was sentenced 
from one to fifteen years to the Utah State Prison. 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDEIJCE \HTH WHICH TO CONVICT 
THE DEFEI\DANT OF THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS WITH 
THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
The evidence in this case did not show the defendant's 
guilt and, in fact, the defendant has consistantly maintained 
her innocence. As has been pointed out by legal scholars 
and noted practitioners such as F. Lee Bailey, a claim of 
innocence is the weakest claim that can be presented on appeal. 
Mr. Bailey has stated that he would rather defend on appeal 
a guilty person who was forced to confess or from whom 
evidence was obtained illegally rather than an innocent 
person whom the jury convicted. 
The undersigned recognizes that perhaps the appellate 
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argument that can be presented on appeal is that there is 
insufficient evidence for a jury to find a verdict of guilty, 
However, in light of such knowledge and because the defendant 
was innocent she will assert on appeal that there v1as insuffic 1 
evidence on which to convict the appellant. 
The defendant was not found in actual possession of 
the narcotics. The narcotics were found in a room while 
the defendant wa~ downstairs cooking in the restaurant. The 
prosecution ar;ued a theory of constructive possession i.e., 
that the de!'endant hc"d control over the room as she was the 
proprietor of the premises and that the room contained 
restaurant books and records and, therefore, she was in con-
structive possession of the narcotics. The only evidence 
brought before the Court was that the defendant was the pro-
prietor of the premises; that the narcotics were found in a 
room which was not the defendant's bedroom; that the room 
in which the narcotics were found contained a bed and in a 
separate part of the room a desk containing records from the 
restaurant. Beside the bed was a nightstand or commode in 
which the heroin was found; the police officers testified 
that the defendant stated that she had "control over the 
room" or control over the entire premises. That is the 
entire evidence upon which the defendant was convicted. 
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The defense proffered testimony that the room was 
occupied by a Mr. Robert Westley. During the search of the 
premises, Mr. Westley was also searched (Tr. 96). The search 
of Mr. Westley uncovered four balloons of heroin on his person 
(Tr. 100). It was proven that the balloons that were taken 
from the suspect Robert Westley were identical to the balloons 
that were found in the room with which the defendant was 
charged of possessing. 
The prosecution's chemist testified that the heroin 
with which the defendant was charged with possessing and which 
was found in the room was cut with quinine. He testified 
that he was quite surprised to find quinine inasmuch as 
quinine was primarily used as a cutting agent in the east 
while in the west lactose was used to cut heroin (Tr. 107-108). 
The evidence showed that Robert Westley was from Chicago. 
The State's chemist also made an analysis of the 
four balloons of heroin that were recovered from the search 
of the person of Robert Westley. In the balloons that were 
recovered from the person of Robert Westley, quinine was also 
found (Tr. 112). Strangely enough, the balloons of heroin 
with which the defendant was charged with possessing and were 
found in the room were also cut with methapyrilene. Again, 
the prosecution's chemist testified that such was an uncommon 
cutting agent (Tr. 109). Coincidentally -- or not so co-
incidentally -- the heroin found on Robert Westley was also 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cut with methapyrilene (Tr. 112). The State's chemist testi'. 
that the chances of finding two samples on different persons 
with the same amount of quinine and the same amount of 
methapyrilene would be very small (Tr. 109). 
The defense called their own expert to reaffirm 
these facts. Kevin L. McCloskey a biochemical toxicologist 
for the Center of Human Toxicology at the University of Utah 
was called tc testi:':y on behalf of the defendant (Tr. 151). 
He examined both the heroin that the defendant was charged 
with possessing which was found in the room and the heroin 
found in the possession of Robert Westley. He performed 
quantitative analysis of the two heroin and found that 
there were no physical dissimilarities (Tr. 153-154). 
Also Ladislav Kopjak, who was a fore~sic toxicologist for 
the Center of Human Toxicology at the University of Utah was 
called by the defense. A forensic toxicologist analyzes 
specimens for presence or absence of drugs or other toxic 
substances (Tr. 155). He analyzed both the specimens with 
which the defendant was charged with possessing which were 
found in the room and the specimens that were found in the 
search of Robert Westley. He testified: 
"I found that quantitatively the samples seemed 
to be similar and there was heroin, quinine, 
and the antihistamine methapyrilene in the balloons 
from 3-P and also 7-D. (Tr. 158) .... 
They both appeared to be similar quantitatively." 
His report was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 11-D. 
He also corroborated the state's expert that quinine 
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was normally used as a cutting agent in the eastern United 
States and not the western area (Tr. 158). 
The prosecution -- not the defense -- elicited 
evidence from the defense witness on cross examination 
concerning the defendant's good character and lack of contact 
with narcotics. The defense witness Edward Barton who was 
a former police officer and presently an investigator for the 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders' Association, testified pursuant to 
questions asked by the prosecution on cross-examination as 
follows: 
Q. Do you know Willie Mae Walker that well? 
A. Yes, I have known her for some time. 
Q. Have you, have you ever known her to be a 
user of narcotic drugs. 
A. No sir, I have not. 
Q. How long have you known her? 
A. Probably five years. (Tr. 150). 
Also the defense witness, James Frank Housley, a prosecutor 
for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office was cross-examined 
by the prosecution: 
Q. How did you characterize your relationship with 
the defendant. 
A. I -- I was her lawyer for three and one half 
or four years and considered myself to be a 
good friend and her to be a good friend to 
me. (Tr. 136). 
It is the defendant's contention that there can be 
no other conclusion reached except that the narcotics found 
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in the room -- the narcotics that the defendant was convicted 
of possessing -- was from the same source as the narcotics 
in the possession of Robert Westley. It is further the 
defendant's position that in view of Robert Westley's occupan~ 
of or at least access to the room in which the narcotics were 
found and the fact that the defendant may also have access 
to that room is insufficient evidence on which to convict her 
of possession of heroin. 
The defense moved for a directed verdict: 
MR. LEEDY: The defense moves for a directed verdict 
of acquittal on the grounds and for the reason 
that there is insufficient evidence from which 
this jury could reasonably determine that the 
heroin contained in Exhibit 3P was possessed 
and belonged to the defendant Willie Mae 
Walker. (Tr. 221) 
A statement of the law and a summarization of the 
pertinent cases is found in Mulligan v. State and Richardson v. I 
State, 513 P. 2d 180 (1973), in that case marijuana was found 
in an apartment to which two persons had access. One of the 
persons was found guilty of possession and the Wyoming Supreme 
Court reversed. In so doing, it stated: 
As to circumstantial evidence in a criminal case, 
we said in State v. RidGout, (I·Jyo.) 450 P. 2d 
452 , 454, 455, evidence creating a mere probability 
of guilt is not sufficient; much less is evidence 
which gives rise to mere suspicious or conjecture 
of guilt . .If the circumstances, no matter 
how strong, can be reasonably reconciled with a 
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theory that some other person may have done the act, 
of the defendant should not be convicted and a verdict 
of guilty should be set aside as contrary to law. 
Gardner v. State, 27 Wyo. 316, 196 Pac. 750, 751; 
Thompson v. State, 41 Wyo, 72, 283 Pac. 151, 157. 
In State v. Haynes, 25 Ohio St. 2d 264, 267 N.E. 
2d 787, 788, the Court held that where the only 
evidence of possession was the police discovery 
of the narcotics in the general living area of 
the apartmP.nt occupied by defendant and four others, 
such evidence was not sufficient to convict for 
possession. 
In Sturgeon v. State, Okl. Cr. 483 P. 2d 335, 338, 
it was held; where an unlawful drug is found in 
premises not occupied exclusively by the defendant, 
and nothing more is shown, the evidence is cir-
cumstantial and insufficient. . . . Convictivn 
was reversed in Thompson v. United States, D.C.C.A. 
293 A. 2d 275, 276, when the court commenting, 
someone in the apartment was in possession, actual 
or constructive, of the marijuana; but the evidence 
failed to make a showing beyond a reasonable doubt 
that appellant was that person. 
In narcotic cases there is respectable authority 
for the proposition that if a person has control 
of premises on which the drugs are found, there 
is a presumption that he was in possession of 
the drugs. On the other hand, if possession is 
not sho~m to be exclusive, there must be. other 
evidence to warrant such inference. One of the 
leading cases for this proposition is People v. 
Antista, 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P. 2d 17~,-r79 
• • . A more recent case and one which like in 
Antista, is frequently cited is Brown v. State, 
Okl. Cr. 481 P. 2d 475, 477-478. It stands for 
the proposition that it cannot be inferred for 
merely being present in a place where marijuana is 
found the defendant had knowledge of its presence 
and had dominion and control. Citing from Antista, 
that court considered it neither for the State to 
prove either that the marijuana belonged to the 
defendant or that it had been left in his care 
by someone else. 
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The Brown court also referred to Petty v. People, 
167 co~o. 240, 447 P. 2d 217, 220, where the 
defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana 
found in an apartment shared with another was re-
versed for insufficiency. 
The rule to be derived in connection with an inferenc' 
of possession of narcotics from possession of premis~ 
is well stated in Felts v. People, Colo. 498 P. 2d 
1128, 1131, in these words: 
"· .. where a person in in possession but not 
in exclusive possession of that premises, it 
may not be inferred that he knew of the presence 
of marijuana there and had control of that 
unless there are statements or other circumstances 
tending to buttress the inference" .. 
In the present case the evidence shows that Robert 
Westley had, at least access if not total occupancy, to the 
room where the 56 balloons of heroin were found. Under law 
as stated above, there will be insufficient evidence to convict 
the appellant for possession of heroin found in that room 
unless there was other evidence indicating that the heroin 
was hers. There was no such other evidence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLO\v TESTIMONY FROM 
THE WITNESS JAf.!ES HOUSLEY THAT ROBERT IVESTLEY OCCUPIED THE 
ROOH IN I'IHICH THE NARCOTICS WERE FOUND. 
During the prosecution's case, the police officers 
attempted to imply that Robert Westley did not occupy the 
room in which the narcotics were found. This was done by 
virtue of testimony to the effect that no articles of men's 
clothing were found in the room (Tr. 80-82, 87). And also, 
by so-called "admissions" of the defendant herself that she 
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had control of the room (Tr. 82-83). The defense preferred 
evidence that Westley did, in fact occupy the room in which 
the narcotics were found. This was done through the testimony 
of the defendant herself (Tr. 165-172), and also another occupant 
of the apartment house, a Mr. Chalmers Hood (Tr. 115). The 
defense desired to support their testimony with the testimony 
of Mr. James Housley, who was a white, a lawyer, and a 
then prosecuting attorney. The prosecution attempted to 
prevent such evidence, first by a "motion in liminie" (R. 76-77), 
and then objections during the course of the examination. 
The defense strongly excepted to the prosecution's 
attempt to cover up that evidence as well as their removal 
of certain evidence from the courtroom during the trial. 
In a motion for a directed verdict the defense counsel stated: 
"I think it raises a Brady v. Maryland problem. 
I think this has been the case from the start. 
I believe it was well within the prosecution's 
knowledge that the room marked "0" was, in fact, 
Robert Westley's room. One of the prosecutors 
visited Mr. Westley in that rarticular room. Not 
only did they not disclose that to me, now I under-
stand they are going to argue maybe it was at a 
different time. Now they have taken the dope out. 
The prosecution responded that a Brady v. Maryland was not 
proper in that no demand was made for exculpatory evidence (Tr. 60). 
The court reprimanded the prosecution, but denied the defendant's 
motion. 
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"Well, the problem with it, Mr. Austin, is that 
when items come into evidence via the preliminary 
hearing stage, or at the trial stage, those are 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and they ar~ 
not to be removed. 
When I say not to be removed, "they are not to 
be removed without a Court order." 
In attempting to elicit the testimony from the wi tnes: 
James Housley, that he had seen Mr. Robert Westley occupy the 
room in which the narcotics were found, the following occurr~: 
Q. And did you have occasion to rep~esent Mr. 
Robert Westley, or a male person known as 
"Billie 11 ? 
A. I had the man known to me as "Billie" consult 
with me and I charged him a fee. I didn't 
repre5ent him any more than just a short 
consultation. 
Q. Now, with respect to that confrontation, did 
you have occasion to visit with him in his 
room above Dell's Cafe? 
MR. AUSTIN: Objection at this point, I believe Lhat 
comes under the attorney-client privilege and 
Mr. Westley is not here to claim the privilege. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. 
is overruled. 
Excuse me. The obj ectio" 
1 
A. I didn't visit in his room, and it wasn't in 
connection with my representation of him, but 
I have seen tim there. 
Q. You have seen Mr. Westley in his room before at 
Dell's Cafe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you describe for the jury which room 
that was? 
MR. AUSTIN: Objection, foundation. 
THE COURT: Foundation. 
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Q. I'll ask you to look at Exhibit 9D and ask if 
you can recognize what that is a diagram of? 
A. I recognize it as a diagram of the second floor 
of what I know as Dell's Cafe on West Second South. 
Q. And are you familiar with Dell's room on Exhibit 9D? 
A. Yes. (Tr. 130-131). 
Q. During the period of time of July -- that is when 
this search was -- July of 1976, are you aware 
of which room was hers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which room would it have been? 
A. This room right here. 
Q. Now, you indicated also that you had occasion to 
visit Mr. Westley on Exhibit -- or excuse me, 
in the upstairs area of Dell's Cafe, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. I don't think I had occasion to visit 
with him there, I saw him there. 
Q. You did see him in his room? 
A. I saw him in a room that I thought was his room. 
Q. Which room? 
MR. AUSTIN: Objection to what he thinks, your Honor, 
only to what he knows. 
Q. Why did you think the room you saw him in was 
his room? 
A. Well, he was getting out of bed, he was undressed 
getting out of bed. 
Q. Okay, what room was that you observed him in? 
MR. AUSTIN: Objection, foundation, time period. 
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained. 
MR. LEEDY: Do you recall when this occasion was? 
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A. Not precisely. 
Q. Could you give me your best recollection? 
A. I knew the man that I knew as "Billie" from late 
December of 1975 until sometime in the summer 
of 1976, and I can't tell you the date. I know 
it was prior to the time that Dell was arrested 
on this charge. 
Q. Now, would you point out for the jury what room 
it was that you observed Mr. Westley getting out 
of bed in, partially clad? 
MR. AUSTIN: Objection to that, your Honor, it would 
be irrelevant, no foundation as to period of 
time. 
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained. 
MR. LEEDY: May I make a proffer. 
THE COURT: You may, outside the presence of the jury. 
MR. LEEDY: Should we approach the bench? 
Unfortunately, the proffer was not recorded by the 
Court reporter, but it has been submitted in the record. 
The proffer was that sometime prior to the search, but after 
December of 1975, Mr. Housley had seen Mr. Westley in the rooo 
in which the narcotics were found and that .Mr. Westley was just 
getting out of bed and was partially clad. 
It is the defendant's position that such evidence was 
relevant and a foundation had been laid. The fact that the 
observation was not made at the precise time of the search 
may go to the weight of the evidence, but would certainly not 
go to its relevancy, nor foundation. 
14 
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The foundational objection was obviously not well taken 
as the witness had testified as to his personal knowledge 
concerning the events about which he was to be examined. 
The relevancy objection was likewise improper. 
Relevant evidence is all competent evidence of facts and 
circumstances which afford reasonable inferences or throw 
light upon the matter or matters contested, 29 Am. Jur. 2d 
299, Evidence, §251. 
One of the extremely relevant issues in the lawsuit 
was whether or not Robert Westley had access to or occupied 
the room in which the ~eroin was found. His occupancy of that 
room at some time prior to the search would certainly be 
relevant inasmuch as a reasonable juror could infer present 
occupancy from prior occupancy. The fact that evidence 
"Is remote in point of time ... does not of 
itself preclude its admissability. . . . In 
effect, the objection of the evidence is too 
remote goes to the credibility of the evidence 
rather than to its admissability, unless the 
remoteness is so great that the proffer of 
evidence has no probative value at all." 
Thus, the sustaining of the objection on grounds of 
relevancy and foundation to the witness Housley's testimony 
was improper and in error. The exclusion of such testimony 
was prejudicial in that it would have supported the defendant's 
position; that Robert Westley had access to the room and, 
thus, the defendant should not have been convicted for possession 
based upon the sole evidence that narcotics were found in the 
same room. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. l AllD NO. 3 CONCERNING ACCESS TO 
OR EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF A ROON l/HERE NARCOTICS ARE FOUND. 
The defendant requested that the District Court instr_ 
the jury as follows: 
the jury: 
Instruction No. l. 11embers of the jury, you are 
instructed that the defendant Willie Mae Walker 
is charged with the crime of possession of 
heroin with the intent to distribute. Before 
the defendant may be found guilty of this offense, 
it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had 
possession o~ heroin. 
The law recognizes two kinds of possession, actual 
possession and constructive possession. Before 
a person can be said to have actual possession, 
a person must knowingly have direct control over 
the substance of the time alleged, and in this 
case, with the required intent to distribute. A 
person may be in constructive possession with the 
intent to distribute rather than actual possession 
when a person knowingly and with specific intent 
to distribut has the power and intention at the 
time alleged to exercise dominion and control over 
the substance. A person is neither in control nor 
in actual possession nor in constructive possession 
unless they have actual power themselves to exercise 
dominion over the substance. 
The mere fact that a person had access to premises 
or may be the legal owner or landlady of the 
premises where a substance is located does not 
establish that the person was in actual or con-
structive possession of the substance on such 
premises. Rather, the prosecution must establish 
control or dominion over the substance and, in 
this case, with the intent to distribute (R 92). 
The defendant also requested the Court to instruct 
Instruction No. 3. Members of the jury, you are 
instructed that the prosecution has the burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt the 56 
16 
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balloons of heroin introduced in this case belong 
to or were possessed by the defendant Willie Mae 
Walker. The mere fact that Willie Mae Walker may 
have had access to the room where the heroin was 
found is insufficient evidence to prove that she 
had possession or control of the substance found 
therein. 
The court refused to give those instructions (R. 90-92). 
The defendant excepted at (R 221). 
MR. LEEDY: The defense will except to the Court's 
failure to give the proposed Instruction No. 3 
concerning access to the room, and believes that 
the general instructions regarding possession and 
control are insufficient and would confuse the 
jury. 
For the same reasons and rationale, in the cases 
stated under Point I, it was error for the Court to fail to 
give the defendant's proposed jury instructions. If more than 
one person has access to a room in which narcotics are found 
for a conviction to be sustained, there must be more evidence 
of possession by one than simply that the narcotics were found 
in the room. Further, if nothing more is shown than the fact 
that an unlawful drug is found on the premises not occupied 
exclusively by the defendant, then an acquittal should be had. 
That was the import of Instruction No. 1 and 3, and in no 
other place did the Court properly instruct a jury as to the 
law where more than one person had access to a room wherein 
narcotics were found. For this reason, the conviction should 
be reversed and a new trial granted with instructions to give 
the proper jury instruction regarding joint access to a room. 
17 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE CONVICTION AS THE 
EVIDENCE WHICH \•!AS INTRODUCED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 1'/J,S 
SEIZED ILLEGALLY. 
As pointed out in the Statement of Fact, the seizure 
of the evidence in this case took place pursuant to a search 
warrant. The search warrant directed a search of the entire 
premises at 511-513 \Vest Second South. The cafe, the several 
different apartments occupied by different people and differen: 
persons. The se~rc~ warrant is overly broad with respect to 
the descriptlon o~ the place and persons to be searched. The 
Court may recall that the Fourth Amendment requires that the 
place to be searched be described with particularity as well 
as the things to be seized or searched for. The search 
warrant in this case describes the business establishements, 
a cafe and apartment house, containing several apartments, 
at two addresses involving several tenants. The law regarding i 
the search of hotels or apartments was laid down in U.S. v. 
Hinton, 219 F. 2d 324 (C.A. 7, 1955). In that case the 
Court stated at page 325: 
The showing of probable cause and the particularity 
of the description of the place to be searched are 
usually treated separately, but in view of the 
many problems presented bv this appeal, they must 
be considered together, f~r the scope of the warrant 
to search is dependent uoon the extent of the 
showing of probable caus~. The command to search 
can never include more than is covered by showing 
of probable cause to search. 
18 
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In this case, one Jane Wilson signed an affidavit 
stating that on the date previous, she had seen 
heroin being sold in the premises .. 
(These are the precise facts that are shown in the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant in the present 
case.) 
The affidavit failed to identify the particular 
apartment or apartments in which the sales were 
made and it did not allege the sales were made in 
apartments occupied by any of the alleged 
sellers. 
(Again, these are the precise facts of the affidavit in the 
instant case.) 
On the basis of these meager factual allegations 
in the affidavit, the government commissioner issued 
a warrant commanding the search of the entire 
building. The add~ess named in the warrant 
is an entire apartment building. 
For purposes of satisfying the Fourth Amendment 
searching two or more apartments in the same building 
is no different than searching two or more completely 
separate houses. Probable cause must be shown 
for searching each house or, in this case, each 
apartment. If such cause is shown, there is no 
reason for requiring separate warrants for each 
resident. A single warrant may cover several 
different places or residences in a single building. 
But probable cause must be shown for searching each 
residence unless it be shown that although appearing 
to be a building of several apartments, the entire 
building is actually being used as a single unit. 
Federal Courts have consistently held that the 
Fourth Amendment requirement that a specific "place" 
be described when applied to dwellings referred to 
as a single living unit, (the residence of one 
person or family). Thus, a warrant which describes 
an entire building when cause is shown for searching 
only one apartment is void. United States v. 
Barkous\as, D.C. 38 F. 2d 837; United States v. 
DianC1e-:-o.-c. 32 F. Supp. 944; United States v. 
Chin On, D.C. 297 F. 531; United States v. Innelli, 
, 0 
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D.C. 286 F. 731, United States v. Mitchell, D.C. 
274 F. 128. The basic requirement is that the 
officers who are commanded to search be able from 
the "particular" description of the search warrant 
to identify the specific place for which there is 
probable cause to ~elieve that a crime has been 
committed. This requirement may be satisfied by 
giving the address of the building and naming 
the person whose apartment is to be searched. 
(Citations omitted). But the warrant here cannot 
be saved by the limiting effect of naming the 
persons whose residence are to be searched 
because it expressly commands the search of the 
entire building .. 
The validity of the warrant depends upon the 
shov.•ing made before the commissioner at the time 
of its issuance. (Citations omitted). It may well 
be that the affidavits show probable cause to 
search the residences of the four women referred 
to, provided they would be accurately identified 
from the alias given. But the affidavit does not 
establish probable cause to search the entire buildim' 
without the allegations of facts to show that each 
of the apartments in the buildings was the resi-
dence of at least one of the persons alleged in 
the affidavit to have been seen selling the nar-
cotics. 
If the officers had found that the defendants 
were the only ones living in the apartment buildins 
and that no innocent persons had actually suffered 
an unjustified search, the warrant would still 
be invalid. The validity of the warrant is 
dependent on the facts shown in the affidavit 
before the issuing authority. 
We are not being overly technical in this. We 
are merely insisting as we must, that in issuing 
search warrants the requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment be met. If innocent persons were 
actually subjected to an un"ust search under 
the warrant in question, he~e, as might well be 
the case, it would still be argued that the de-
fendants were not harmed thereby and, thus, should 
not be able to challenge the warrant because its 
coverage was too broad. The cases already cited 
make it clear that this argument has not been 
accepted by the courts because they are determined 
to discourage the practice of issuing warrants 
without a sufficient showing of cause or, as in 
this case, where the cause shown docs not cover 
as broad an area as the command search. 
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The record in this case does show that several people 
were living in the apartment portion of 511-513 West Second 
South (R. 164-167). 
The rule as established in Hinton is also relied 
on in state cases. People v. Franks, 221 N.W. 2d 441, relying 
on Lyman v. United States, 297 F. 177, Cert. Den., 266 u.s. 
604. 
The above test s&tisfies the general rule behind the 
prohibition of the rourth Amendment requiring the description 
of places with particularty which is that the adequacy of 
the description of a search warrant is determined by whether 
or not given specificity of the warrant, violation of personal 
rights is likely, either through a general search directed 
toward intended persons or a search incorrectly directed 
toward different and presumptively innocent persons. U.S. v. 
Bynam, 386 F. Supp. 449, affd. 573 F. 2d 533. 
It is the defendant's position that the search warrant 
was so general as to allow the search of various tenants' 
apartments for which no probable cause was shown in the 
affidavit supporting the search warrant is so general as 
to be defective, nor does such a search warrant comply with 
the rules laid down in the cases above mentioned. 
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The warrant itself also commanded the search of 
persons for which no probable cause was shown. The search 
warrant commanded the search of a "male person known only a 
'Billie'". In fact, the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant no where mentions the name "Billy" except as a person 
to be searched. 
There is no question that the search warrant was 
overly broad ana commanded the search of places and persons 
for which no probable cause was shown. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBIT 
5 WHICH 1'/AS T\'10 ENVELOPES ADDRESSED TO \'liLLIE 1'/ALKER, 511 
WEST SECO~D SOUTH, AND THE SEIZURE OF SUCH EVIDENCE FROM THE 
SEARCH OI' THE PREMISES, WAS ILLEGAL AND OUTSIDE THE SCOPE 
OF THE WARRANT. 
The search warrant in this case permitted and commandeci 
the search for narcotics. The search warrant mentioned 
nothing about any envelope containing the name of the defendant 
which might subsequently be used as evidence. Thus, the 
seizure of the envelopes was not within the direction or 
confines of the search warrant; nor could a search warrant 
for the seizure of envelopes be issued. 
Section 77-54-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides 
the grounds for the issuance of a search warrant 
and allows the seizure of property 
(i) When stolen or embezzled; 
(ii) When it was used as a means for committing 
a felony; 
(iii) When it is in the possession of a person 
with the intent to use it as a means for 
committing a public offense. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, m y contain errors.
Utah statute does not allow a search for "mere 
evidence. The envelopes being "mere evidence" and were not 
within the mandate of the search warrant and should have been 
suppressed and the introduction thereof into evidence was in 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, 
There was insufficient evidence upon which to convict 
the defendant inasmuch as the only evidence of possession that 
narcotics were found in a room to which the defendant had 
access as others also had access. 
The Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony 
of the witness James Housley to the effect that he had seen 
Robert Nestley occupying the room in which the narcotics were 
found prior to the search; the refusal to allow such testimony 
was prejudicial inasmuch as access to the room was a key 
issue in the case and Housley would have been an important 
witness to the defendant as he was the only white witness 
who obviously had no reason to lie or be untruthful. 
The Court erred in refusing to give the defendant's 
proposed instructions which provided that if more than one 
person had access to a room in which narcotics were found, then 
the prosecution must prove more than mere presence of a nar-
cotic in order to convict the defendant of possession. 
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The search warrant in the instant case was overly 
broad and commanded the search of apartments and persons for 
which no probable cause was shown and such invalidates the 
entire search -- probable cause must be shown for the search 
of each apartment in an apartment building and the fact that 
there is probable cause to believe that narcotics may be 
present in some part of the apartment building does not justif) 
a search warrant commanding the search of the entire building. 
The seizure of the two envelopes was beyond the 
scope of th~ ~arrant and constituted mere evidence and the 
introduction thereof was improper and in error. 
DATED this 
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